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Railway Infrastructure Projects

Major Port and Rail Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa

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by

Aaron
in

Sub-Saharan Africa is witnessing an unprecedented wave of port and rail infrastructure development, aimed at boosting trade, integration, and economic growth. Below are some of the major projects currently underway, along with their key details.

East Africa

LAPSSET Corridor (Kenya–Ethiopia–South Sudan)

Northern Corridor Standard Gauge Railway (Kenya–Uganda)

  • Project Overview: Kenya and Uganda are developing a Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) network from the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa through Nairobi and on to Uganda, often called the Northern Corridor SGR. Kenya’s segment spans ~600 km from Mombasa to Nairobi (completed) and onward to Naivasha, with planned extensions to Kisumu and the Ugandan border. Uganda’s segment would continue from Malaba to Kampala. The railway is designed for modern high-speed freight and passenger service, replacing the old meter-gauge line and connecting landlocked Uganda (and potentially South Sudan/DRC via branches) to Mombasa port (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank).
  • Investors & Funding: The Kenyan SGR has been built largely with Chinese financing. China Eximbank funded 85% of the Mombasa–Nairobi line (Kenya’s largest ever infrastructure loan, about US$3.8 billion, equivalent to 6% of GDP) (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank) (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank). Additional Chinese loans of ~$1.5 billion were taken for the Nairobi–Naivasha extension. The contractors are Chinese (China Road and Bridge Corporation and affiliates). Kenya’s government provided the remaining funds and land acquisition. Uganda had negotiated with China for a $2.2 billion loan for its Malaba–Kampala SGR, but as of 2023 China has not approved it, leading Uganda to explore alternative funding or upgrading its existing railway instead.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The SGR is intended to dramatically improve transport efficiency along East Africa’s main trade corridor. The Kenya SGR has cut passenger travel between Mombasa and Nairobi from ~12 hours by road to about 4–5 hours by rail. For freight, the government projected over 60% reductions in transport time and cost compared to the old line (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank). Each freight train can carry double-stack containers equivalent to 200–500 truckloads, easing highway congestion (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank). The line has already shifted a significant share of Kenya’s import-export cargo off roads, helping reduce delays at Mombasa port. In the long term, an integrated SGR would lower logistics costs for Uganda, South Sudan, eastern DRC and Rwanda, boosting regional trade under the AfCFTA.
  • Challenges: The project faces financial sustainability concerns. The debt repayment burden on Kenya is high – the railway has not yet generated sufficient revenue to cover its operating costs and hefty Chinese loans, leading to fiscal strains (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank) (Kenya’s Railway is at the Center of Struggle with China over Debt). Utilization has been below expectations partly because the line currently terminates inland (Naivasha) rather than at the Uganda border – requiring costly transshipment to trucks. The planned extensions to Uganda (and Uganda’s own SGR leg) have stalled due to financing delays, undermining the original vision of seamless rail service (Kenya’s Railway is at the Center of Struggle with China over Debt). There are also regulatory hurdles in making the railway competitive (such as setting tariffs attractive enough to draw shippers from road transport). Additionally, land acquisition and community compensation issues caused project delays, and there was public debate in Kenya about the railway’s cost and land impacts.
  • Timeline: Construction of the Mombasa–Nairobi section began in late 2013 and the line was completed ahead of schedule, opening for service in mid-2017 (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank). The Nairobi–Naivasha segment opened in 2019. Further extension within Kenya (to Kisumu and Malaba) is on hold pending funding. Uganda’s SGR segment has not broken ground as of 2025, as Uganda is now considering revamping the older meter-gauge line in the interim. Given these uncertainties, the full Mombasa-Kampala SGR connection may not be realized until the late 2020s.
  • Policy/Regulatory: The Northern Corridor SGR is backed by the Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Agreement among East African states, which harmonizes customs and transit rules. Kenya and Uganda have had to negotiate bilaterally and with lenders (China) on loan terms and railway operations. Reforms in Kenya’s port and rail regulations – such as requiring certain import cargo to move by rail – were implemented to increase SGR throughput, though they faced resistance from trucking lobbies. Regionally, the project aligns with the EAC’s infrastructure development strategy. However, Uganda’s pivot away from the SGR (due to debt concerns) highlights how national policy shifts can impact cross-border projects.

Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway (Tanzania–Rwanda–Burundi)

  • Project Overview: Tanzania is constructing an ambitious Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) network to link its Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam to internal cities and neighboring countries. The main line (1,219 km) will run from Dar es Salaam westward through Dodoma and Tabora to Mwanza on Lake Victoria (African Development Bank Leads $1.2 Billion Financing Syndication for Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway Project | African Development Bank Group). Branch lines are planned to Kigali, Rwanda and to Burundi (connecting at Uvinza), and an extension north to link with Uganda and the DRC is envisioned, effectively creating a Central Corridor rail route. The railway is built to modern standards (electric, high-speed) to replace the old Central Line meter-gauge railway, allowing faster passenger trains and heavy freight haulage (up to 10,000 tonnes per train) (Tanzania SGR project timeline and all you need to know | Sigma Plantfinder Limited).
  • Investors & Funding: The Government of Tanzania initially funded early phases using domestic funds and sovereign bonds. Subsequently, significant external financing has been arranged. In 2018, Tanzania secured a US$1.46 billion loan from Standard Chartered Bank for the Morogoro–Dodoma section (Tanzania SGR project timeline and all you need to know | Sigma Plantfinder Limited). More recently, in 2023–24 the African Development Bank approved approximately $900 million (incl. $200 m from the World Bank) to finance sections of the line (Tanzania secures $1.2bn from AfDB for Standard Gauge Railway …) (New World Bank Financing to Boost Safety and Efficiency of …). A consortium of Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, and others is syndicating $1.2 billion for the Tabora–Kigoma segment (African Development Bank Leads $1.2 Billion Financing Syndication for Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway Project | African Development Bank Group). Chinese companies have won contracts for the later phases: a $2.21 billion contract was signed in 2023 with China Civil Engineering Construction Corp (CCECC) for the Tabora–Kigoma stretch (Tanzania signs $US 2.21bn contract for Tabora – Kigoma SGR), and in January 2025 Tanzania and Burundi jointly awarded a $2.15 billion contract to Chinese firms to build the 282 km link from western Tanzania into Burundi (Tanzania, Burundi sign $2.15bn railway deal with China) (Tanzania, Burundi sign $2.15bn railway deal with China) (with AfDB providing financing support). Overall, the SGR project is estimated to cost over $10 billion for all phases.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The SGR is expected to be transformative for Tanzania and its landlocked neighbors. It will significantly cut transit times and costs: freight tariffs are projected to be ~40% lower than by road, and an electric train can traverse the 300 km from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro in 2.5 hours (Korean-made high-speed trains make debut in Tanzania as work on …). By creating a faster outlet to the sea for Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern DRC, the railway will boost regional trade. It effectively revives the Central Corridor – providing an alternative to Kenya’s route – which could enhance competition and lower prices for importers/exporters. Tanzanian officials foresee new mining and agricultural trade corridors opening up (African Development Bank Leads $1.2 Billion Financing Syndication for Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway Project | African Development Bank Group). For instance, Burundi’s nickel exports and Rwanda’s goods will be transported by rail to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania, Burundi sign $2.15bn railway deal with China) (Tanzania, Burundi sign $2.15bn railway deal with China). Within Tanzania, the rail will spur development of inland regions (Dodoma, Tabora, etc.), create jobs, and reduce road congestion and accidents. In the long run, the Central Corridor SGR combined with the existing TAZARA railway (to Zambia) could form part of an “Atlantic-to-Indian Ocean” link via the DRC and Zambia.
  • Challenges: The project’s scale and cost are huge for Tanzania. Mobilizing over $10 billion has strained government finances and required juggling multiple lenders. There were initial delays in securing external funds, leading Tanzania to self-finance sections – an approach that not all phases could sustain. Construction has encountered typical challenges such as land acquisition issues and the need to relocate utilities and communities along the route. There is also the challenge of ensuring the network’s sustainability: the SGR must attract sufficient freight volumes (especially from neighboring countries) to service its debt and operating costs. Competition from Kenya’s established northern corridor and potential underuse if connections to Rwanda/Burundi/Uganda are delayed could impact revenues. Finally, cross-border agreements (e.g. on gauge compatibility, customs procedures) with Rwanda and Burundi are vital; any diplomatic or political changes could affect the seamless operation of cross-country services.
  • Timeline: Tanzania broke ground on the first segment (Dar es Salaam–Morogoro, 300 km) in 2017. By 2020 that section reached ~82% completion (Tanzania SGR project timeline and all you need to know | Sigma Plantfinder Limited), and test runs with new electric trains began in 2023. In April 2023, Tanzania launched its first electric trains on the Dar–Morogoro stretch, and by early 2024 trial services extended to Dodoma. The Dar to Dodoma line (about 720 km) was officially inaugurated for passenger service in 2023–2024. Construction is concurrently ongoing on the remaining phases: Dodoma–Tabora, Tabora–Mwanza, and the branch to Burundi all kicked off between 2021 and 2023. The entire core network within Tanzania is slated for completion around 2025–2027, with the international links to Burundi and Rwanda targeted by 2030.
  • Policy and Frameworks: The SGR is a priority in Tanzania’s development plans and is supported by regional initiatives. It aligns with the East African Community’s Railway Master Plan, which aims to establish interoperable standard-gauge networks among member states. Tanzania has structured the project as a government-led initiative with external loans, rather than a concession, reflecting its policy of retaining ownership of strategic infrastructure. Nonetheless, operating models are being discussed to improve efficiency (including possibly engaging private operators once the line is complete). Internationally, the project is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative footprint in Africa, and Tanzania negotiated terms to maximize local benefits (such as sourcing materials locally and technology transfer). The African Development Bank and other multilateral institutions have worked with Tanzania to ensure the railway is integrated into regional trade corridors (for example, simplifying customs at the Tanzania-Burundi border for rail cargo).

Berbera Port and Corridor (Somaliland–Ethiopia)

  • Project Overview: The Port of Berbera, located in Somaliland (a self-governing region of Somalia), is being expanded into a major regional port to serve the Horn of Africa. The Berbera port project, coupled with a new Berbera Corridor highway, aims to provide landlocked Ethiopia an additional access to the sea and to establish Berbera as a Red Sea trade hub. The first phase of expansion added a new 400 m container quay with a deep draft of 17 m, increasing Berbera’s container capacity from 150,000 TEU to 500,000 TEU per year (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone) (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). A second phase will extend the quay to 1,000 m and boost capacity to 2 million TEU, along with development of a free trade zone (Berbera Economic Zone) near the port (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). A modern highway from Berbera to the Ethiopian border (Wajaale) is under construction in parallel, funded by international partners, to link the port to Ethiopia’s road network (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone).
  • Investors & Funding: The Berbera Port is being developed by DP World (UAE) under a 30-year concession with the Somaliland government. DP World has committed up to US$442 million for the port expansion (in phases) (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). The first phase (costing around $90 million) was completed in 2021. Somaliland retains a 30% stake in the port, and initially Ethiopia was slated to take a 19% stake by investing in corridor infrastructure (to secure trade access). The Berbera Corridor road is financed by a combination of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development and grants from the UK and EU (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). This public-private mix ensures Somaliland shares ownership while leveraging DP World’s capital and expertise.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The expanded Berbera Port and corridor are set to significantly benefit Somaliland and Ethiopia. For Somaliland (which has limited international recognition), the project creates jobs and revenue and positions Berbera as a strategic alternative to Djibouti for Horn of Africa trade. The port’s new container terminal (and planned free zone) are expected to attract investment and turn Berbera into an industrial and logistics hub (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone) (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). For Ethiopia, which currently relies on Djibouti for ~90% of its maritime trade, Berbera offers a second outlet, potentially lowering transport costs through competition. Studies indicate Ethiopian traders could save time and money by routing cargo via the shorter Berbera corridor for the northern regions of Ethiopia. The corridor may also spur development in Ethiopia’s eastern regions (through which the road passes). Overall, the project enhances regional trade integration in the Horn of Africa and could handle a portion of the growing Ethiopia import-export volume (Ethiopia’s trade is forecast to outgrow Djibouti’s port capacity in coming years).
  • Challenges: The project faces unique political and security challenges. Somaliland’s uncertain international status means global lenders (like the World Bank) cannot directly fund its infrastructure – reliance on a private operator (DP World) and a patchwork of donors was necessary. Tensions have arisen with Somalia’s federal government, which opposes Somaliland’s independent port deals, though de facto the project has proceeded. Security in the region is a concern: while Somaliland itself is relatively stable, the Somalia milieu carries risks (piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Al-Shabab militancy, though the latter is minimal in Somaliland). Another challenge is ensuring that Ethiopia uses the Berbera route; this depends on competitive pricing and seamless logistics. Ethiopia has multiple corridor options (Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya’s Lamu in the future), so Berbera must prove reliable and cost-effective. Additionally, the Berbera corridor road needs timely completion – trade volumes will grow only if inland transport to Ethiopia is efficient. Logistics at the border (customs cooperation between Somaliland/Somalia and Ethiopia) also require careful alignment.
  • Timeline: Construction at Berbera started after the DP World concession agreement in 2017. The first new container terminal berth was inaugurated in June 2021 (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). As of 2023, that terminal is operational with modern cranes. The second phase expansion (additional quay length and cranes) was announced and ground broken in mid-2021, with work ongoing through 2024 (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). The Berbera–Wajaale highway is well advanced and expected to be fully completed by 2024, according to project updates, to align with port expansion. Plans for the Berbera Economic Zone (an industrial park near the port) have also moved forward, with the first phase under construction in 2022 (DP World and Somaliland open new terminal at Berbera Port, Announce Second Phase Expansion and Break Ground for Economic Zone). Overall, Berbera is on a faster track compared to many regional projects, with major components coming online by 2025, transforming Berbera into a functional trade corridor.
  • Policy/Regulatory: Somaliland has created a conducive regulatory environment by granting DP World a long-term concession and establishing the Berbera Special Economic Zone with tax incentives. Ethiopia and Somaliland signed agreements to facilitate Ethiopian use of the port, including preferential berthing and plans for Ethiopia to have a logistics facility at Berbera. Furthermore, the project aligns with the Horn of Africa Initiative (a regional cooperation platform) which includes improving transport corridors. Internationally, major powers (UAE, and by extension Gulf states) have strategic interest in the Red Sea, and the UAE’s involvement has diplomatic backing. One sensitive aspect is that this project proceeded outside the framework of the Federal Government of Somalia, which has occasionally created diplomatic frictions; however, regional and international stakeholders have largely accepted it due to its economic merits. The AfCFTA, once fully implemented by Somalia/Somaliland and Ethiopia, is expected to further ease trade along this corridor by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

West & Central Africa

Nigeria’s Railway Modernization Projects

  • Project Overview: Nigeria is undertaking multiple railway projects to modernize its colonial-era rail network and improve connectivity within the country and with its neighbors. Key projects include the Lagos–Kano Standard Gauge Railway, a new north-south line roughly 1,300 km long in phases (Lagos–Ibadan completed, Ibadan–Kano ongoing), the Eastern Railway from Port Harcourt to Maiduguri (1,443 km, being rehabilitated/upgraded), and the Kano–Maradi line (284 km) linking northern Nigeria to Maradi in Niger (Construction begins on Nigeria-Niger line). Additionally, the Abuja–Kaduna standard gauge line (190 km) has been operational since 2016, and a central line (Itakpe–Warri) was completed in 2020. These projects aim to create a national rail grid and also connect to Niger’s rail system, improving regional trade in West Africa.
  • Investors & Funding: China is the predominant financier and contractor for Nigeria’s rail projects. Chinese state banks (China Eximbank, China Development Bank) have provided loans for the Lagos–Ibadan segment (~$1.3 billion) and have committed to fund extensions (e.g. a recent CDB loan of $255 million for the Kano–Kaduna section) (Nigerian project secures Chinese loan – International Railway Journal) (China Development Bank grants first loan to railway project in Nigeria). The Lagos–Kano line is being built by China Civil Engineering Construction Corp (CCECC) in segments, with Nigeria providing counterpart funding. The Kano–Maradi rail was awarded to Portugal’s Mota-Engil for $1.8 billion, reportedly financed through a combination of export credits and federal budget (Mota-Engil in the running for Bogotá contract – – Essential Business). The Port Harcourt–Maiduguri rehab (estimated $3 billion) is also led by CCECC with funding from Standard Chartered and possibly Chinese banks (China’s CCECC secures $3.02bn Nigerian Eastern Railway contract). Overall, Nigeria’s government is leveraging loans (mainly Chinese) covering the bulk of costs (often 75–85%), with the rest from its own coffers.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The rail upgrades are expected to be a game-changer for Nigeria’s economy by improving freight and passenger transport across its vast territory. The completed Abuja–Kaduna line, for example, cut travel time between the capital and Kaduna to 2 hours (versus ~4 by road) and quickly became popular for safer travel. The new Lagos–Ibadan line (completed in 2020) now transports both passengers and cargo, easing traffic on the busy Lagos-Ibadan expressway. Once fully connected, the Lagos–Kano railway will facilitate movement of goods from the ports in Lagos to the commercial cities in the north, boosting trade and agricultural shipments. The Kano–Maradi line will open trade routes with Niger, allowing Nigeria to export more cement, fertilizer, and consumer goods to Niger while Niger can transit uranium, oil, or other exports through Nigerian ports (Construction begins on Nigeria-Niger line). Rehabilitating the Eastern line (Port Harcourt–Maiduguri) will revive economic activity in the impoverished northeast and integrate that region with the rest of the country, potentially aiding efforts to stabilize it. Collectively, these rail projects could reduce cost of land transport (currently one of the highest in Africa in Nigeria) and create thousands of jobs. The Nigerian government has touted that the ongoing railway expansion and new seaports (like Lekki) together will make Nigeria a continental trade hub.
  • Challenges: Nigeria’s rail modernization faces significant challenges, chiefly funding and debt sustainability. Several projects have stalled or slowed due to delays in agreed loan disbursements and Nigeria’s own budget constraints – e.g. the crucial Ibadan–Kano segment awaited a $5.3 billion Chinese loan that took long to materialize (Despite the delay in the approval of the $5.3billion Chinese loan by …) (Lack of funds stalls N16tr railway projects across Nigeria – Daily Trust). As of 2023, Nigeria’s external debt and fiscal pressures have grown, raising questions about how to finance the remaining rail segments (the Daily Trust reports over $21 billion of rail projects are facing funding delays) (Lack of funds stalls N16tr railway projects across Nigeria – Daily Trust). Security is another major challenge: in early 2022, terrorists attacked an Abuja–Kaduna train, forcing a months-long shutdown of that service and highlighting risks in certain corridors. Ensuring safety of tracks and passengers (especially in the northwest and northeast where insurgency and banditry are present) is critical. Operational efficiency is also a concern – the new lines need professional management and maintenance. Nigeria has struggled with its state railway corporation’s performance in the past, so authorities are exploring concessioning operations to private firms for better results. Finally, land acquisition in densely populated areas (especially the southern segments) encountered some disputes and delays. Despite these hurdles, the government remains keen, and there’s strong public demand for improved rail services.
  • Timeline: The modernization program has been ongoing for over a decade. Abuja–Kaduna SGR commenced in 2011 and opened in 2016. Lagos–Ibadan SGR started in 2017 and began operations in mid-2021 (Project {} | china.aiddata.org). The extension from Ibadan northward saw groundwork initiated in 2021, but major construction will accelerate as financing is secured (the government optimistically eyes completion around 2025–2026 for Ibadan–Kano). Kano–Maradi’s construction was flagged off in early 2021 and was reportedly slated for completion by 2025 (Kano-Maradi railway to start operating in May 2023), though progress depends on consistent funding. Rehabilitation of the Eastern line also kicked off in 2021; parts of that narrow-gauge line may reopen by 2024, but full completion is uncertain due to security issues in the northeast. In summary, Nigeria has made some visible progress (about 386 km of new standard-gauge lines operational so far), with multiple projects in the construction phase and expected to come online in the next 2–5 years, provided financing and security issues are managed.
  • Policy/Regulatory: The Nigerian government has prioritized rail in its Economic Recovery and Growth Plan and subsequent national development plans. It has updated its railway legislation to allow private investment and concession arrangements in what was traditionally a state monopoly sector. For instance, the Kano–Maradi line contract with Mota-Engil includes provisions for local content and training, reflecting new policies. Nigeria is also coordinating regionally: the ECOWAS protocols encourage inter-state rail links (hence the Niger connection), and there’s ongoing collaboration with Niger on customs and operational issues for the cross-border line. Additionally, Nigeria’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative has framed many of the rail investments – Chinese funding came under this banner (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank). However, Nigeria has been cautious lately about over-reliance on Chinese debt and is exploring diversified funding, including commercial loans and public-private partnerships. There is also an emphasis on adhering to international safety and interoperability standards (the standard-gauge lines all use 1435 mm gauge to potentially link with networks beyond Nigeria in the future). In summary, supportive policies and reforms are being rolled out to ensure these large rail investments deliver value and can be maintained via efficient operations.

Lekki Deep Sea Port (Nigeria)

  • Project Overview: Lekki Deep Sea Port is a newly built port in Lagos State, Nigeria – the first deep-water seaport in Nigeria and one of the biggest in West Africa (Lekki Port – Wikipedia). Located in the Lagos Free Trade Zone on the Lekki Peninsula, it was designed to relieve the congested Apapa ports and become a regional transshipment hub. The port has an initial capacity of 1.2 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) per year and a 16.5 m deep berth, allowing it to handle ultra-large container ships (up to 14,500+ TEU vessels) that previously could not call in Nigeria (Lekki Port – Wikipedia) (Lekki Port – Wikipedia). In addition to container terminals, Lekki Port has provisions for liquid bulk and dry bulk terminals in future phases. The port infrastructure covers 90 hectares, with state-of-the-art cranes and equipment installed. Full build-out could increase capacity to 2.5–6 million TEU, making it a key node for West African trade growth (Lekki Port – Wikipedia) (Lekki Port – Wikipedia).
  • Investors & Funding: Lekki Port was developed as a Public-Private Partnership. The majority stake (75%) is held by private investors – the Singapore-based Tolaram Group and China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) – while the Nigerian Ports Authority (federal government) and Lagos State Government hold the remaining 25% (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters). Funding of about $1.5 billion was raised via equity and debt from a consortium of banks, including a significant loan from China Development Bank. CHEC not only invested equity but also served as the EPC contractor (engineering, procurement, construction). The port’s development benefited from tax incentives due to its location in a free trade zone, and the government provided support in form of land and connection infrastructure. This mix of foreign (Chinese, Singaporean) capital and local public sector support exemplifies the funding model for large African ports.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The Lekki Deep Sea Port is hailed as a “game changer” for Nigeria’s economy (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters). It effectively doubles Lagos’s container handling capacity and will drastically reduce vessel wait times and congestion costs that plagued Apapa Port. Transshipment: Lekki is positioned to become a transshipment hub, where large ships can offload containers for redistribution to other West African ports, potentially capturing business that was going to hub ports like Tema or Durban. The port is also expected to create an estimated 200,000 jobs (direct and indirect) once fully operational (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters). It anchors the broader Lekki-Epe corridor development, which includes the Dangote oil refinery, petrochemical plants, and the free trade zone – all these industries will use the port, boosting Nigeria’s non-oil exports (e.g., fertilizer, petro-products) and reducing import costs. By handling larger ships and more volume, Lekki Port should lower the unit cost of shipping to Nigeria, with trade experts projecting significant savings and more reliable supply chains. Furthermore, the port’s modern facilities strengthen Nigeria’s bid to become the maritime logistics hub of the Gulf of Guinea region.
  • Challenges: Despite its successful completion, Lekki Port faces a few challenges in its ramp-up phase. Connectivity Infrastructure: The port became operational in 2023, but the surrounding road network is still being upgraded. The Lagos State government has had to accelerate work on expanding the access roads to six lanes to handle port traffic (Lekki Port – Wikipedia). Until these upgrades and planned rail links are in place, congestion around the Lekki axis could shift the bottleneck inland. Operational Efficiency: Ensuring that customs procedures and evacuation of cargo are smooth will be critical – issues that affected Apapa (like customs delays and lack of truck parking) must be avoided through better planning and digitization at Lekki. Competition: Other countries in the region (e.g. Ivory Coast’s Abidjan, Ghana’s Tema, Senegal’s new port) are also expanding capacities, so Lekki will need to deliver high efficiency and reasonable tariffs to attract shipping lines. Additionally, trade volumes depend on Nigeria’s economic stability; currency or import restriction policies could affect utilization. Environmental and Community Impact: The Lekki area community raised concerns about coastal erosion and fishing livelihoods due to the port’s massive breakwaters and dredging. Mitigation measures are being implemented, but ongoing community engagement is necessary to manage local expectations and ensure inclusive growth.
  • Timeline: Construction of Lekki Port began in 2017 after financial close. Despite COVID-19 related slowdowns, the project progressed steadily. By late 2022 the port construction was substantially complete, and it was officially commissioned in January 2023 by Nigeria’s President (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters). The first commercial ship actually docked at Lekki in late 2022 during trial operations (Lekki Port – Wikipedia), and full commercial operations commenced in April 2023 (Lekki Port – Wikipedia). The port is now operational, handling container vessels. The focus in 2023–2024 is on scaling up operations to capacity and completing ancillary infrastructure (road expansions, barge jetties, etc.). Plans for Phase 2 (additional berths and terminals) will be triggered by demand growth, potentially within a few years given Nigeria’s large import volumes.
  • Policy/Regulatory: The success of Lekki Port is underpinned by supportive policies such as Nigeria’s port concession framework and the designation of Lekki as a Free Trade Zone (providing tax holidays and ease of doing business for port users). The Nigerian Ports Authority shifted from being an operator to a landlord/regulator model, allowing private port operators like Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise to run the facility. This is in line with Nigeria’s 2006 port reform that has generally improved efficiency at terminals. On a strategic level, the government’s push to make Nigeria a trading hub under the AfCFTA complements Lekki Port – the AfCFTA could increase Nigeria’s regional exports, for which Lekki provides the needed capacity. The government is also updating customs processes with scanners and a single window system at new ports to meet international standards. Lastly, Lagos State’s involvement ensured alignment with local urban planning. Overall, Lekki Port’s operation will be governed by Nigeria’s port laws and concession agreements, with regulatory oversight to prevent monopolistic practices and ensure fair pricing that boosts trade competitiveness (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters).

Port of Ndayane (Senegal)

  • Project Overview: The Port of Ndayane is a new deep-sea port being built about 50 km south of Dakar, Senegal. It is one of the largest greenfield port projects in Africa and will supplement the existing Dakar Port, which is constrained by city congestion. Ndayane’s first phase will have a container terminal with 840 m of quay and a 5 km marine channel, capable of handling 1.2 million TEUs annually (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal) (DP World begins construction of $1.13bn deep-water port in Senegal). The port sits on a 600 hectare site, allowing room for expansion – a second phase plans an additional 410 m of container quay (bringing capacity to 2.5 million TEU) and terminals for bulk cargo. With a depth of 18 m, Ndayane will accommodate ultra-large ships (up to 366 m length in Phase 1, and 400 m in Phase 2) (DP World begins construction of $1.13bn deep-water port in Senegal) (DP World begins construction of $1.13bn deep-water port in Senegal). The project also includes development of an economic zone and improved road links to Dakar. Once complete, Ndayane will be West Africa’s deepest port and is expected to become a key regional hub for containers and other cargo.
  • Investors & Funding: The Ndayane Port is a public-private partnership led by DP World (Dubai’s global port operator) in partnership with the Government of Senegal. DP World secured a 50-year concession and is investing an estimated $1.1–1.3 billion in two phases (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal) (DP World begins construction of $1.13bn deep-water port in Senegal). Phase 1 (around $837 million) is financed by DP World’s equity and debt, and includes construction of the first container terminal and dredging. Senegal’s government (through the Port Authority of Dakar, PAD) is a minority partner and contributed the land and relocation of affected fishing communities. The project is noted as the largest single private investment in Senegal’s history and DP World’s biggest port investment in Africa (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal). Multilateral development banks have shown interest in financing supporting infrastructure (roads, etc.), but the core port investment is privately funded.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The new port is anticipated to double Senegal’s container handling capacity and significantly boost its role in regional trade. Dakar’s current port, while strategically located, is hemmed in by the city and has limited room to grow; Ndayane will overcome this by offering modern, efficient facilities that reduce ship waiting times and allow larger volumes. It will solidify Dakar’s position as a gateway for the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, etc. rely on Senegal for imports/exports). According to Senegal’s government, during construction the project will create about 1,800 jobs, and once operational, it could indirectly support up to 2 million jobs through improved trade and logistics (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal) (DP WORLD KICKS OFF MARITIME CONSTRUCTION AT NEW $1.2 …). The port will also have an adjacent industrial zone, which is expected to attract manufacturers and logistics companies, further stimulating the economy. By enabling direct calls of bigger vessels, Ndayane can lower freight costs for Senegalese importers and exporters (fewer feeder transshipments via Europe), benefiting sectors like agriculture and mining. Moreover, the port’s capacity and efficiency could make Senegal a transshipment center in West Africa, handling cargo for neighboring countries. Overall, the project aligns with Senegal’s development plan to become an emerging economy by 2035, by improving trade infrastructure and creating a maritime hub for West Africa (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal).
  • Challenges: Building a brand-new port has involved various challenges. Environmental and Social: The project required the relocation of some coastal communities and fishermen who used the area. Ensuring fair compensation, new housing, and preserving fishing livelihoods has been a delicate process. Environmentalists have also watched the dredging and land reclamation carefully, as it affects marine ecosystems and coastal erosion patterns. Infrastructure Connectivity: The success of Ndayane hinges on connecting it to Dakar and hinterland markets; this means constructing new highways or rail links. Financing and executing these connecting projects in time for port opening is an ongoing challenge (the government is seeking funds, including possibly from China or the AfDB, for a dedicated road/highway). Market Risk: The port’s business case assumes growing volumes and capturing market share from competitors. If global trade slows or if operational hiccups occur, there’s a risk the port could be underutilized initially. Also, existing vested interests (like businesses around the old Dakar port) might resist or take time to shift to the new port. Operational Startup: Training labor and implementing advanced IT systems for a modern port is crucial – Senegal will need to ensure that the port workforce and customs officials are prepared for the new facility to hit efficiency targets from the start.
  • Timeline: The foundation stone for Port of Ndayane was laid in January 2022 (DP World starts construction of Port of Ndayane, Senegal), marking the start of construction. As of late 2023, dredging and quay construction for Phase 1 were well underway. DP World aims to complete Phase 1 by 2025, with the first terminal becoming operational shortly thereafter. Phase 2 will be triggered by demand, possibly starting a few years after Phase 1 opens (maybe around 2026–2027) to expand capacity. The development agreement gives DP World some flexibility on timing for later phases depending on cargo volume growth. In parallel, Senegal is upgrading road infrastructure; a new highway linking Dakar to the Ndayane area (an extension of the Dakar–Diamniadio toll highway) is planned to ensure smooth transit to the port by the time it opens. If construction stays on schedule, Ndayane Port will begin handling ships before 2025 ends, easing pressure on Dakar Port and allowing Senegal to decommission or repurpose some older facilities in the capital.
  • Policy/Regulatory: The Government of Senegal has actively supported the project through favorable policies. It provided DP World a long concession and incentives as part of a Strategic Development Agreement. Senegal’s port regulator and customs authority are implementing reforms to make Ndayane a “smart port” with digital customs clearance and efficient one-stop services for traders. At a higher level, the project fits into the African Union’s PIDA framework which identified Dakar as a key regional port node to expand (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)-Central …). Also, Senegal’s participation in AfCFTA means the new port could handle increased intra-African trade volumes under lower tariffs. Notably, Senegal has balanced relations with global partners – while DP World (UAE) is building Ndayane, the country is also receiving finance from institutions like the EU for related projects, which indicates a coordinated approach under its laws. As the port comes online, Senegal may update regulations regarding traffic between the old and new ports, land use around Ndayane, and public-private operation standards to ensure smooth integration of this mega-project into its economy.

Port of Banana (DR Congo)

  • Project Overview: The Port of Banana is a greenfield deep-sea port being developed on the Atlantic coast of the Democratic Republic of Congo. DRC has a very short coastline (37 km) and until now had no deep-water port (only shallow river ports like Matadi and Boma). The Banana Port project will give DRC a modern seaport capable of handling large ocean-going vessels, thus ending its reliance on transiting goods via neighboring countries’ ports. Phase 1 of the project involves building a 600 m quay with a 25-hectare yard, creating an annual capacity of about 350,000 TEU and 1.5 million tons of general cargo (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). This includes container berths and general cargo terminals equipped with new cranes. Future phases (up to four phases projected) would expand the port based on demand, with a total investment potentially exceeding $1 billion over time (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). The port site at Banana is at the mouth of the Congo River, with natural deep water access once dredged. A new road/bridge will connect the port to the existing highway to Matadi, and there are plans for an industrial zone near the port to capitalize on improved trade access.
  • Investors & Funding: The Banana Port is being developed under a joint venture between DP World and the Government of DRC. In 2021, DP World secured a 30-year concession (with a possible 20-year extension) to finance, build, and manage the port (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages) (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). DP World owns 70% of the project company, and the DRC government holds 30% (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). The first phase investment is about $350 million, funded by DP World and its lenders, with construction initially expected to take ~2 years (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). The government contributes by facilitating land and regulatory support, but most capital comes from DP World. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other institutions have shown interest in later phase financing if needed, but as of now the funding is predominantly a DP World commitment. This public-private approach allows DRC to get a major infrastructure asset with limited immediate public expenditure.
  • Expected Economic Impact: The Banana Port is poised to significantly benefit the DRC’s economy. Currently, a large share of Congolese imports/exports (for the populous western DRC including Kinshasa) go through the ports of Pointe Noire (Republic of Congo) or via transshipment at ports like Durban, adding cost and time. A domestic deep-sea port will reduce transportation costs and times for DRC’s trade by enabling direct calls from Asia and Europe (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). It is estimated to save weeks on shipping time for some cargo and cut costs by up to 40% for Congolese businesses that no longer need to truck goods from neighboring countries (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). The port will also attract larger vessels, meaning economies of scale for imports like machinery, construction materials, and containerized goods for Kinshasa’s ~15 million population. On the export side, DRC can ship out its products (like agricultural goods, timber, and potentially some minerals) more competitively. Beyond trade, the port is expected to create jobs and spur development in Kongo Central province. Logistics, warehousing, and ancillary services will develop around the port, and the improved connectivity might encourage investment in export-oriented industries (since the port will be coupled with a planned special economic zone). Strategically, having its own ocean port boosts DRC’s trade sovereignty and bargaining position in regional commerce. It will allow the DRC to capitalize more on the African Continental Free Trade Area by more easily trading with West Africa via Atlantic sea routes.
  • Challenges: The project has faced delays and has several challenges ahead. It was initially agreed in 2018 but only formally launched in late 2021, partly due to negotiations and questions about its viability. Political and Governance: DRC’s history of governance issues means that ensuring transparency and stability of the concession is crucial – there were domestic criticisms about the 30-year concession terms and how profits will be shared, which required careful handling. Construction Challenges: Banana is in a remote area with little existing infrastructure; building a port from scratch requires significant supporting work (dredging the Congo River mouth, constructing breakwaters, etc.) in a challenging oceanic environment. Transport Links: For the port to be useful, the road connection to inland cities (Matadi–Kinshasa route) must be efficient. Currently, the road and rail from Matadi to Kinshasa need upgrades. Without reliable onward connectivity, the port could risk being underutilized. Competition and Demand: The port’s business depends on capturing traffic that currently goes through Matadi (an upriver port) and Pointe Noire. Matadi’s operators (a competing port consortium) might lower their rates or improve efficiency to retain cargo. Additionally, since Banana’s initial capacity (350k TEU) is modest, it will need to scale up phases in time as demand grows; timing those investments will be tricky. Security and Stability: Though far from conflict zones, any instability in DRC’s politics or economy could impact the port’s success. Lastly, environmental impact on the sensitive estuary ecosystem must be managed, as the Congo River mouth is biologically rich – DP World has to adhere to environmental safeguards to protect mangroves and marine life during port construction and operation.
  • Timeline: After years of discussion, the DRC government and DP World signed the collaboration agreement in December 2021 (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages), allowing construction to formally begin in 2022. As of 2023, site clearing and initial marine works were underway. The project is expected to take about two years for Phase 1, so the target for completion of the first phase is around late 2024 or 2025 (DP World expands African footprint with new port in Democratic Republic of Congo – Africa Business Pages). Given some earlier delays and the scale of work, it’s possible the opening might be closer to 2025. Subsequent phases will be developed over a 10–20 year horizon, driven by throughput growth: e.g., Phase 2 might start by 2030 if Phase 1 reaches capacity. In parallel, upgrades to inland transport (the road from Muanda/Banana to Matadi and rail improvements) are being planned so that by the time the port opens, goods can move smoothly to Kinshasa. DRC’s government has expressed optimism that the first ships will call at Banana by 2025, finally placing the country on the world maritime map.
  • Policy/Regulatory: The Banana Port project is a key part of DRC’s National Strategic Development Plan to improve transport infrastructure. The 30-year concession agreement includes regulatory provisions for tariff setting, with the government having oversight through the 30% ownership and a regulatory agency to ensure that port fees remain competitive. DRC has also joined regional initiatives like the Transit and Transport Coordination Authority of the Northern Corridor (even though it’s mostly an Atlantic project, integration with regional trade rules is beneficial). Moreover, the project received backing under the AfCFTA infrastructure umbrella as it will facilitate intra-African trade on the Atlantic side (Trade infrastructure financing in Africa: an exploration of geopolitical funds for private sector participation – Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI)) (Trade infrastructure financing in Africa: an exploration of geopolitical funds for private sector participation – Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI)). The government will need to synchronize customs regulations at Banana with those at Matadi and land borders, potentially creating a one-stop border post concept for goods moving to/from Banana. Internationally, this project adds to DP World’s Africa portfolio – as such, DRC may benefit from DP World’s compliance with global standards (the concession likely follows IFC Performance Standards for social/environmental aspects, given DP World’s involvement). Finally, to maximize the port’s impact, DRC is considering establishing a free trade zone or special economic zone near Banana, which would require enacting specific regulations for businesses operating there (tax breaks, simplified procedures, etc.).

Southern Africa

Lobito Corridor and Rail (Angola–DRC–Zambia)

Policy and Regulatory Frameworks Shaping Projects

Major port and rail projects in Africa are influenced by continent-wide policy initiatives and national regulatory reforms that aim to facilitate infrastructure development:

  • African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): The launch of AfCFTA in 2021 has increased urgency for infrastructure that eases the movement of goods across borders (Trade infrastructure financing in Africa: an exploration of geopolitical funds for private sector participation – Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI)). By lowering trade barriers, AfCFTA is expected to boost intra-African trade by an estimated 28% in freight volume (Trade infrastructure financing in Africa: an exploration of geopolitical funds for private sector participation – Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI)), which in turn pressures countries to upgrade ports, rails, and corridors. Governments are prioritizing these projects to capitalize on AfCFTA opportunities, and AfCFTA’s protocols on transport and trade facilitation provide a cooperative framework (e.g., harmonizing customs procedures) that benefits these infrastructure corridors.
  • Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA): The African Union’s PIDA initiative identifies and promotes priority regional projects – many of the above ventures (LAPSSET, the North-South Corridor, Lobito Corridor, etc.) are designated PIDA projects. PIDA provides a platform for African governments to coordinate and attract international support. It also pushes for “soft” infrastructure policies like one-stop border posts and regional rail agreements. For example, PIDA’s transport outlook emphasizes connecting landlocked countries to ports via regional corridors (Transport Sector – The Virtual PIDA Information Center), directly underpinning projects like the Lobito and Central Corridors. PIDA’s endorsement often helps mobilize funding from the AfDB and others by signaling a project’s high regional impact.
  • Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Frameworks: Recognizing huge financing gaps (estimated $68–108 billion per year for African infrastructure (Trade infrastructure financing in Africa: an exploration of geopolitical funds for private sector participation – Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI))), many African nations have enacted PPP laws and reforms to attract private investment into transport infrastructure. The port projects in Nigeria, Senegal, DRC, and Somaliland are all PPPs with long-term concessions. Countries have had to strengthen legal frameworks to protect investors while safeguarding public interests. For instance, Nigeria’s 2006 Ports Act enabled private port operations; Kenya and Tanzania have passed laws to allow private concessions on rail and port assets. These frameworks are crucial for projects like Ndayane or Banana Port, as they provide legal clarity on issues like profit repatriation, arbitration in disputes, and tenure of rights, thereby reducing investor risk.
  • Environmental and Social Safeguards: Large infrastructure projects must navigate environmental regulations and community rights. Many African countries, often supported by the World Bank and others, have updated their environmental laws to require impact assessments and community consultations. This affects how projects are implemented – e.g., the LAPSSET Corridor had to undergo strategic environmental assessments, and Tanzania’s SGR was routed to avoid wildlife parks where possible. Adhering to international safeguard standards is also often a condition of funding (as seen with multilateral lenders on the Lobito Corridor ensuring compliance with social/environmental best practices (AFC – Notícias insights notícias) (AFC – Notícias insights notícias)). Thus, regulatory oversight of environmental and social impact is an integral part of project planning now.
  • Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Africa’s RECs (EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, etc.) provide regulatory harmonization and oversight for cross-border projects. The EAC, for example, has standard protocols for railway development and has been involved in the Northern and Central Corridor projects to ensure compatibility and fair usage by member states (The LAPSSET Corridor: A Case Study in Regional Integration – Afri Fund Capital). ECOWAS is driving the Abidjan–Lagos highway and related port improvements with uniform technical standards across five countries (Africa’s biggest new infrastructure endeavours will transform the continent’s transportation and energy landscapes in 2024 – IOA). SADC’s protocols have guided the Zambia–Angola–DRC agreements on the Lobito Corridor. These regional policies help address soft issues like customs, axle load limits, and cross-border railway interoperability, which are essential for the success of the hardware being built.
  • Trade Facilitation and Customs Reform: Alongside physical construction, African governments (often with donor support) are modernizing customs and border management. The One-Stop Border Post concept (where export and import procedures are done in one location) is being implemented on corridors like East Africa’s Northern Corridor, reducing clearance times. Digitization of port and customs processes (single windows, tracking systems) is being rolled out in ports like Mombasa, Durban, and soon in Lekki and Ndayane, under the guidance of agreements like the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement which many African states have ratified. These reforms amplify the benefits of new infrastructure by speeding up the movement of goods and cutting red tape.
  • Debt Management and Sustainable Financing Policies: Given the scale of borrowing for these projects, countries are also instituting policies to manage debt and explore new financing models. Some are turning to eurobond financing, others to development finance institutions or blended finance to reduce reliance on any single creditor. For example, Kenya, after heavy borrowing from China for the SGR, is now seeking a mix of financiers for LAPSSET’s continuation. Likewise, the Lobito Corridor’s funding through PGII represents a policy shift to diversify partners. Institutions like AfDB have set up African infrastructure investment funds, and governments are improving project preparation units to make projects bankable for investors (The LAPSSET Corridor: A Case Study in Regional Integration – Afri Fund Capital). Ensuring these projects are financially viable and do not overly burden public finances is now a key policy focus, often guided by IMF/World Bank advice for countries with high debt.

In summary, a combination of continental initiatives (AfCFTA, PIDA) and national regulatory improvements (PPP laws, customs reforms, debt management) is creating a more enabling environment for large-scale port and rail projects in Africa. These frameworks, paired with strong political will, are crucial for the timely and successful implementation of the infrastructure initiatives transforming the region’s economic landscape.

Sources: Major news outlets, development agency reports, and official statements have been used to compile the above details, including Reuters (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters) (Nigeria opens ‘game changer’ billion-dollar deep seaport | Reuters), African Development Bank releases (African Development Bank Leads $1.2 Billion Financing Syndication for Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway Project | African Development Bank Group) (Africa’s biggest new infrastructure endeavours will transform the continent’s transportation and energy landscapes in 2024 – IOA), project authorities’ data (Lamu Port – LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority) (Kenya Tries to Jump-Start New Seaport With Better Equipment, Lower Fees), and industry analyses (Lessons from Kenya’s New, Chinese-funded Railway | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank) (Africa’s biggest new infrastructure endeavours will transform the continent’s transportation and energy landscapes in 2024 – IOA), among others. Each specific claim is supported by citations as indicated.

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